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Abstract
The rise of education features prominently in the debate on the sources of modern 
economic growth. Existing accounts stress the importance of popular demand for its 
public provision. We argue that such an explanation for the spread of schooling is 
a poor fit for many nations’ schooling histories, such as Imperial Austria. We show 
that in the Austrian case, schooling and economic development had limited impact 
on each other; that the popular demand for schooling was weak and that the push for 
school expansion came mainly from the top of the political hierarchy.
Keywords Public schooling · Education · Economic development · Austria
JEL Classification N13 · I25 · I28
1 Introduction
Across the industrialized world, economic modernization historically went hand 
in hand with the emergence of modern mass schooling. Not surprisingly, the exist-
ence and strength of the causal link between schooling and economic development 
has been investigated in numerous cross-sectional regressions (Sala-i-Martin 1997; 
Hanushek and Woessmann 2012). Proposals regarding the provision of schooling 
count among core policy recommendations issued to developing countries around 
the world (Easterlin 1981). But apart from these economic considerations, pri-
mary and secondary education has also historically served as a vehicle of political 
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socialization through inculcation of specific cultural values and through building a 
sense of shared history and national allegiance (Glaeser et al. 2007; Bandiera et al. 
2016; Pritchett and Viarengo 2015).
The politics and the economics of mass schooling have always been intertwined, 
given the prominent role played by the public sector in this area (Lindert 2004: 
Chapter 5). What a particular educational system is supposed to achieve—whether 
development, or socialization or some combination of both—and who supports its 
creation and pays for it—whether the elites or the masses—are closely related ques-
tions because particular political constituencies support particular schooling poli-
cies, expecting particular benefits in return for their support. Our aim in this paper 
is to ask precisely these interconnected questions in case of the schooling system 
introduced in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in Imperial Austria.
As we discuss in greater detail in Sect.  2, when the masses support schooling, 
they expect to benefit from the economic advance and modernization that it ena-
bles. In those circumstances, traditional elites (such as landed aristocracy) are usu-
ally the main bulwark of opposition. This line of argument, recently revisited by 
Lindert (2004), Go and Lindert (2010), Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000) and others, 
sees modern growth as a consequence of (among other things) the rise of national 
public systems of education which themselves were the product of broadened politi-
cal voice and mass electoral support for tax-based schooling. An alternative line of 
reasoning sees traditional elites as supportive of mass schooling, when such school-
ing served to reinforce traditional political structures while posing limited risk of 
disruptive economic transformation. Under such conditions, it is quite conceivable 
to have a long-standing schooling system with an almost universal reach and gener-
ating high levels of educational attainment (measured in years of schooling), which 
nonetheless has limited impact on economic development.
We argue that the schooling system introduced by the Habsburg emperors in late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century was of this latter kind. We build our case 
in three steps. First, we describe the regulation pertaining to elementary school-
ing, which we take at face value as an expression of the preferences of the ruling 
elites. We show that this regulation downplayed the importance of teacher train-
ing and was even suspicious of “too much knowledge” (Engelbrecht 1986). Teach-
ing practical (and marketable) knowledge and skills beyond rudimentary literacy 
and numeracy—what German pedagogy then called Realia—was of second-order 
importance in the curriculum, while religious instruction stressing obedience, loy-
alty and social conservatism was prominent. Next, we investigate whether school-
ing in its mandated form enhanced the sophistication and human capital intensity of 
the local labor market, thereby giving the masses an avenue for economic advance 
and consequently a reason to support it. We do not find evidence of such positive 
impact, except in places (mainly towns) where the curriculum was broad enough to 
include some instruction in practical knowledge. Finally, we look at various constit-
uencies’ readiness to contribute to this public good. Using the Austrian institution 
of school patronage (Schulpatronat), we show that the central authorities and aris-
tocratic elites, not the mass of villagers in local communities, were the most deter-
mined and single-minded, if not always successful, force for the extension of school-
ing in Austria. The policy makers controlled the content of education but (perhaps 
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as a result) continued to be frustrated in their efforts to spread it to such extent, as 
they desired. The general population in towns and villages mostly proved reluctant 
to make good on (let alone go beyond) the existing regulations. Thus, in contrast to 
the usual upbeat story of newly enfranchised but credit-constrained masses wisely 
voting themselves more public school provision to be financed by stingy elites to 
further the economic fortunes of their children and their country, we describe a sys-
tem where the elite foisted a politically motivated education on lukewarm masses 
while making them pay for it mostly out of their own pockets—all with predictably 
mixed results.
One advantage of centrally mandated schooling systems, such as the Austrian 
one, is that they were often accompanied by extensive data collection at several lev-
els of aggregation, allowing us to investigate these issues in close range. In 1865, the 
government commissioned the first comprehensive school census which reported 
detailed information on staff, curriculum and enrollment for each of the almost 
11.000 schools across Imperial Austria (K.K. Statistische Zentral-Commission 
1870). We merge this dataset with the 1863 empire-wide census of all steam engines 
(our proxy for local level of technological sophistication) and with the 1869 popula-
tion census. We use the data on employment structure to construct a measure of the 
human capital intensity of the local labor market and analyze its variation in relation 
to local schooling supply, using a simultaneous equations model. Finally, for one 
of the provinces, Lower Austria, we were able to locate an 1852 teacher and school 
directory which, when linked with school-level data from the 1865 survey, allows 
us to go all the way down to the level of individual schools and their school patrons 
and investigate change in school provision across time at school level (Kaiser 1852).
Our results have implications for how we evaluate the impact of schooling on 
economic growth. Whether a particular educational system “contributed” to a 
country’s development or whether it “failed” cannot be measured just in terms of 
enrollment, the staff availability and the level of public expense. Public spending on 
schooling is an investment that may or may not bear a return depending on how well 
that investment is made (Hanushek 2013). If such an investment yields scant returns 
or if the education is supplied beyond where benefits cover the costs on the margin, 
then the public outlay, in whole or in part, may represent a deadweight loss. In those 
instances, high enrollment and high public outlays are not a boon to the economy 
but only a costly burden.
2  Expansion of schools: existing explanations
Many existing accounts explain the rise of modern schooling in a bottom-up fash-
ion, almost as a grassroots movement. The underlying logic is that universal access 
to productivity-boosting skills held the promise of lifting large swathes of the popu-
lation from poverty and the masses therefore supported expansion of tax-financed 
education. It is in this context that Lindert (2004: 87) called public schooling 
expenditure “the most positively productive kind of spending” and “the greatest 
shift of resources from upper income groups to the poor”. The notion of schooling 
as a skill-generator also underpins, for example, the debate about the contribution of 
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popular Prussian primary education to Germany’s economic ascendancy during the 
Second Industrial Revolution (Becker et al. 2011); the concurrent failure of British 
educational system to keep up with Germany (Lindert 2004: 113–115; Galor 2011: 
34); the role of the American high school in the “the race between education and 
technology” (Goldin and Katz 2008).
But this framework underplays the fact that the very same education systems 
also served as tools of nation building through socialization (even indoctrination) 
of pupils. Cinnirella and Schueler (2016) show that primary schooling of Imperial 
Germany increased the vote for nationalist parties because it was partly designed 
to produce “loyal citizens,” while Bandiera et  al. (2016) explain the emergence 
of compulsory schooling laws in US states toward the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury as means to facilitate integration of immigrants into the American body pol-
itic. In the context of twentieth-century Portugal, Palma and Reis (2018: 5–6) 
document the deeply ideological view of education under both the First Repub-
lic (1910–1926) and the authoritarian Estado Novo (1926–1974). Historically, 
nation-building efforts drew on any number of motivations, be they the need to 
face down an outside threat (Aghion et al. 2012), or a totalitarian government’s 
efforts to shore up its ideological hegemony through indoctrination (Lott 1999). 
In this telling, the main reason why modern schooling became universal, public 
and highly politicized was because its creation was informed by “an endeavor to 
construct a unified national polity” (Ramirez and Boli 1987: 3).
Intuitively, the political alignments either in favor or against public education 
correspond with each constituency’s perceived costs and benefits. Mass education 
systems geared toward equipping the masses with necessary skills for the modern 
economy will likely ensure a broad popular support, given the private returns to 
skill on the labor market. Although skill instruction can be easily supplied pri-
vately (Pritchett and Viarengo 2015), the masses are likely to support public pro-
vision of schooling, if such instruction is expensive. On the other hand, ruling 
elites may plausibly support a nation-building schooling system, which would 
socialize the populace into accepting existing political realities. Such school sys-
tem designed to just inculcate subservience is likely to leave the general popula-
tion indifferent.
Analogously, landowners can be expected to oppose education complemen-
tary to industrialization as it may reduce land rents (Galor et al. 2009). This “Tory 
opposition theory” (Lindert 2004: 100) has been investigated in numerous con-
texts, although the method of obstruction ascribed to landowners, varies across 
researchers. The less obvious and less frequently invoked is a demand-side argument 
whereby high inequality of land ownership implied a large population of landless, 
poor or enserfed agricultural laborers whose incentives to acquire human capital 
were weak (Beltran and Martinez-Galarraga 2015; Cinnirella and Hornung 2016). 
The more straightforward manner of obstruction was by political opposition. It 
took primarily the form of limitation of suffrage, as argued by Sokoloff and Enger-
man (2000) and Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000) for the case of Latin America and by 
Gallego (2010) for all former colonies. In the opposite direction, Go and Lindert 
(2007, 2010) showed a positive effect of broader suffrage on enrollment and on pub-
lic spending per pupil. But even in the context of universal suffrage, landed elites 
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could win out just by being better politically organized (Ramcharan 2010: 729; 
Goni 2017). Vollrath (2013) documents that more skewed farm-size distribution had 
negative effect on tax revenue of local school districts in the USA of 1890, which, 
again, most likely operated through local elections. The notion that the extension 
of suffrage or some other way of voicing keenly felt popular demand for education 
led to an increased local public provision of schooling reappears in explanations for 
many countries through many epochs, e.g., Brazil in 1890–1930 (Musacchio et al. 
2014), post-1860 Russia (Nafziger 2011), early nineteenth-century Britain (Mitch 
2012) or early twentieth-century BRICs (Chaudhary et al. 2012).
In contrast to these narratives of landed opposition, our contribution is to present 
and analyze a case of a schooling system supported and promoted by the ruling (and 
landowning) elite. In the Habsburg Empire, the original and continuing impetus for 
the spread of primary schooling came decidedly from the top of the political hier-
archy. It was also a schooling system heavily focused on particular political sociali-
zation and suspicious of extensive skill acquisition. Ficker (1873) documents, for 
example, that for the whole first half of the nineteenth century, the Austrian govern-
ment pushed for the spread of primary schooling but resisted the growth of second-
ary, particularly technical, schooling.
What about the masses living under the Habsburg scepter? The Austrian his-
torical context makes measuring popular political voice difficult. Go and Lindert’s 
(2010) choice of votes cast in presidential elections makes sense in the context of 
American political institutions but for most countries such measure is too restrictive, 
if it exists at all. Many European countries at the time of Industrial Revolution had 
scarcely any democratic institutions, and the cross-sectional variation in suffrage, 
where it existed, was small. Special interests and various constituencies still found 
ways to voice their concerns but the political voice was much less formalized and 
thus harder to measure. We exploit the fact that while the oversight over content of 
education was centralized and tightly controlled, the school financing was mostly 
local with some selective subsidization from the center. We interpret the readiness 
of various constituencies to financially contribute to schools as a measure of their 
support for this system.
3  The institutional framework
Already at its inception in 1774, the Austrian schooling system was informed by the 
ruler’s intention to use it as a tool for state building and political control. The keenly 
felt need to bolster waning seigneurial authority on aristocratic estates by inculcat-
ing discipline in serfs, the recognition that literate culture was easier to censor than 
purely oral one as well as (overwrought) worries about the spread of crypto-Prot-
estantism all coalesced into a school reform plan that aimed to be universal in its 
reach and firmly in control of the curriculum (Melton 1988). The Allgemeine Schu-
lordnung of 1774, the basic law on systematic primary schooling, introduced several 
basic long-lasting features, such as the compulsory schooling for both boys and girls 
aged 6–12, the distinction between country schools and town schools, the compul-
sory certification of teachers, including private tutors, and the stress on religion and 
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the trivium. In 1805, this law was replaced by the “Political Constitution of Ger-
man Schools” (Politische Verfassung der deutschen Volksschulen)—a much more 
detailed, comprehensive regulation, which remained in force until 1869 (and which 
informs our analysis in the rest of the paper). In some 478 detailed, micromanag-
ing articles, the law regulated everything including the size of school desks (Article 
356), size of classrooms (Art. 365), approved textbooks (Art. 321), length of school 
day (Art. 80), method of instruction1 (Art. 38), minimum teacher salary (Art. 167) 
and even pupils’ attire on examination day (Art. 91). It also established education 
monopoly for government schools by outlawing unauthorized, private “backstreet 
teachers,” Winkellehrern (Art. 128 and 344), who throughout the eighteenth cen-
tury had been offering quick, cheap instruction in reading and writing in numerous 
central-European cities.
Regulation of the curriculum left little doubt that the main purpose of the school 
was proper socialization, as opposed to learning practical knowledge. Article 28 
declared religion the most important subject. In countryside schools, the legally 
mandated lesson plan specified that catechism and biblical history take up six out of 
eighteen weekly lessons for the 9–12-year-olds and four out of nine weekly lessons 
for the 6–8-year-olds. The law stipulated that a school day should begin or end with 
a lesson of religion (Art. 82) and mastery of the religious content (not of literacy) 
was a prerequisite for progressing to a higher grade (Art. 66). Article 41 stressed that 
the purpose of the religious instruction was to inculcate willing compliance in the 
peasants, thereby echoing a century-old tradition in pedagogical thought of viewing 
schooling as a tool of social control (Melton 1988: 38–40). The system also betrayed 
a preference for (though not insistence on) instruction in German. Textbooks for 
non-German nationalities were bilingual, and teachers were expected to be conver-
sant in German, whatever their mother tongue (Art 217–218). Cases where “Roma-
nian children were taught in Polish to read from a German textbook” (Prausek 1868: 
6) opened the system to accusations of both inefficiency and Germanization.2
Writing, reading and counting were next in importance after religion, apportioned 
equally across the remaining weekly lessons. The authorities apparently realized that 
a successful strategy against unauthorized teaching would require meeting the urban 
demand for literacy and other skills half way but such instruction was granted reluc-
tantly: The law warned against “excessive knowledge” and considered teaching it to 
all social classes a “major error in public education” (Art. 28, 44). As for literacy 
and numeracy, Articles 315–316 specified that first-grade pupils should only learn 
1 Article 38 stated that “the Bell-Lancaster method” of peer learning, then popular in England, “was 
banished from our class-rooms.” Post-1848, teachers had somewhat more leeway in choosing their teach-
ing approach but, for various reasons, only few teachers took up the opportunity to update their methods 
(Ficker 1873: 40).
2 The revolutions of 1848 produced a few changes in legislation, most notably an explicit statement in 
favor of instruction in one’s mother tongue, freedom of teaching methods, an optional expansion of pri-
mary schools from two grades to three grades and an extension of teaching colleges from one year to 
two. But other attempts at liberal education were soon quashed through the Concordat of 1855, which put 
the Church yet again firmly in charge of the school supervision and teacher appointments. Even the lan-
guage provisions were less than perfectly enforced and the freedom of teaching method fell flat.
1 3
The rise of public schooling in nineteenth-century Imperial…
to recognize letters, learn basic pen strokes and learn rudimentary mental arithme-
tic. The second grade would introduce reading of short stories, writing to dictation, 
penmanship and written calculation. Not much practical, functional literacy could 
be expected among pupils after the first two grades. Only in the third grade would 
the students be exposed to the four primary arithmetic operations and the rule of 
three (Art. 33). Only from the third grade on would they also learn basic composi-
tion, such as writing an official letter. The fourth grade also offered basic geometry, 
history, geography of the Empire and even what one may translate as basic structural 
design (Baukunst). In short, while the first two grades offered little beyond rudi-
mentary literacy, the third and fourth grades used literacy and numeracy as build-
ing blocks for further skills that one may reasonably see as practical and therefore 
marketable.
Importantly, most children were never to enter the third grade or beyond because 
the law expected most schools to be two-grade schools. Children would spend 
2 years in the first grade before progressing to the second grade for their remaining 
school years. Rural schools especially were envisioned as two-grade. Although they 
were not explicitly prohibited from opening a third grade, some of the law’s provi-
sions implied that progression to a third grade presupposed a transfer from rural to a 
town school (Art. 65). The law distinguished between rural and urban education, of 
which the latter was a little more sophisticated: Town schools taught from somewhat 
different textbooks than country schools, and their teaching was to reflect the pupils’ 
greater exposure to trade and urban life (Art. 43). Of course, in the context of the 
first half of the nineteenth century, “town” referred to the traditional local market 
centers, not sprawling new industrial cities. At any rate, the Habsburg Empire had 
few of either.
Conveniently, this contrast, embedded in the law, between a narrow curricu-
lum of bare literacy for the rural majority and a somewhat more extensive one for 
a small minority of urban pupils finds an interesting labor market counterpart in 
Mokyr’s (2005: 1160) observation regarding the distribution of human capital in 
the workforce during the period of the First Industrial Revolution: The “technologi-
cal changes of the nineteenth century created a demand for highly skilled mechan-
ics and engineers in the upper tail of the distribution, while possibly reducing the 
need for skills among manual laborers” (Mokyr and Voth 2010: 29). Consequently, 
“the modal level of knowledge” was low, but the variance in skill distribution prob-
ably rose. The Austrian elementary school certainly did not produce engineers and 
mechanics but the weekly three hours of geometry, two hours of Baukunst and ten 
hours of drawing in the third and fourth grades of town schools could plausibly help 
the pupils to eventually become workers “who could accurately produce the parts, 
using the correct dimensions and materials, [or] who could read blueprints” (Mokyr 
2005: 1159). In short, a path to such skills did exist in the system of Austrian school-
ing, but it was closed to almost all pupils, except for a lucky (urban) few who had 
the opportunity to become the upper tail of the skill distribution among workers.
While the law constrained access to practical skills, it was very adamant about 
subjecting all children to the socializing parts of education. In order to ensure ade-
quate infrastructure, various stakeholders were obligated to supply the resources for 
school provision (construction, maintenance, teacher salary and accommodation). In 
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principle, in every parish and wherever 100 school-age children lived within half-
hour of walking distance, a school was to be built (Art. 17 and 336–338) with ide-
ally 80 but certainly no more than 100 pupils per classroom and per teacher (Art. 
346–352). Yet, the reality, depicted in Table 1, did not always conform to regulation. 
This was particularly the case with physical infrastructure, which in many provinces 
struggled to even just keep pace with population growth. A few urban schools con-
tained more than one classroom and were therefore able to accommodate even sev-
eral hundred students but the bulk of schools were modest one-classroom affairs and 
so values below 1 in Table 1 are a reasonable indication that many schools crowded 
in well over 100 pupils per classroom. The regulators were aware of the problem, 
which is why the law allowed such overcrowded schools, as a temporary measure of 
last resort, to split the school day into morning instruction for grade 2 (9–12-year-
olds) and afternoon instruction for grade 1 (6–8-year-olds) (Art. 81 and 314). Only 
Tyrol consistently reported values above 1, because this mountainous Alpine region 
required a separate school in practically every village.3 The availability of teaching 
staff was somewhat better although even here some provinces did not quite keep up 
with the student population. For both schools and teachers, however, Austrian prov-
inces were far behind Prussia (note that the Prussian statistics are calculated per 100 
pupils aged 6–14, not 6–12).
Financing of these newly mandated schools was a perennial problem. The author-
ities did not want to make public schooling unpopular from the outset by levying 
a specific, earmarked school tax (Ficker 1873: 22). Instead, to put school financ-
ing on a more systematic footing, the government obliged manorial lords to sup-
ply firewood to schools and eventually introduced, for all other maintenance costs, 
the institute of school patronage (Schulpatronat) in 1787, which remained in place 
until the early 1860s. In this arrangement, the school financing was hitched onto 
a previously existing system of church patronage: Whoever had been responsible 
for the upkeep of local church—whether the local landowner, a government fund, a 
religious order, a free town—was now also saddled with contributions to the financ-
ing of local school.4 As the system settled down in early nineteenth century, the 
school patrons contributed to maintenance and repairs (Art. 389) as well as teaching 
aids (Art. 383), and, until 1848, were also responsible for co-financing new class-
room construction, when it was necessary (Frank 1898a: 22). This last obligation 
became negotiable when serfdom and patrimonial administration were abolished in 
1848 (Helfert 1860: 140). Throughout its existence, the Schulpatronat engendered 
3 The Tyrolean schools only convened for half a year for various local reasons. Moreover, Austrian sta-
tistics made no conceptual distinction between enrollment and attendance even though from the context 
of the operation of the schools, it is clear that they were enrollment numbers. As a result, even identical 
enrollment records of two distinct provinces may be associated with very different amounts of education 
provided to local pupils.
4 In this way, even the Emperor and certain institutions of central government entered into school 
patronage, such as on Crown estates or on the estates of former Jesuit order, whose property was confis-
cated by the government, when the order was abolished. Therefore, not only was the central government 
the ultimate arbiter in general schooling policy matters for all schools, it was also a local stakeholder for 
those schools where it served as the school patron.
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considerable dissatisfaction on all sides because it required complex negotiations 
between numerous parties about obligations (Art. 397) and once a constitutional, 
representative government was introduced in 1861, provincial assemblies abol-
ished it within their first term of office. While it lasted, however, the Schulpatro-
nat was the primary channel through which the landed (and other) elites were made 
to contribute directly to the financing of local schools, specifically of the physical 
infrastructure.
The local communities—towns, villages, parishes—were to take care of the 
teacher salary (Art. 197). Table 2 shows how varied the salaries and their sources 
were. There is no obvious pattern to why some provinces relied primarily on the 
public purse while others levied more tuition but the contrasts were quite stark. 
Tyrol, Littoral and Carniola let most pupils enroll free of charge and paid most of 
the salary out of public budgets, while in Bohemia, Moravia and Upper Austria, 
two-thirds of the teacher salary came from tuition. The salaries did not hold up well 
even against wages for unskilled labor (Cvrcek 2013).5 Yet, given that teacher sala-
ries represented the bulk of the cost of school provision, Table 2 suggests that these 
costs were mainly passed onto the local population and often specifically onto the 
pupils’ families, while landed elites contributed little to salary outlays.6 
The purpose of this detailed exposition is to place the Austrian schooling system 
in the context of the existing debate, outlined in Sect. 2, and to carefully locate, by 
a close reading of the regulation, the fault lines between the country and the city, 
between the socializing two-grade education and potentially skill-enhancing third- 
or higher-grade education, and between the landed elites and other stakeholders. As 
is clear from the institutional exposition, the elites affected schooling at two levels: 
at the highest, policy-making level in Vienna and at the more local, school-patron-
age level where the ins and outs of financing were being negotiated. We assume that 
at the policy-making level, the elite’s preferences were expressed in the enacted reg-
ulations, which shaped the system to the extent that they were successfully enforced. 
We analyze this impact in Sect.  5. On the local level, we study the landed elites’ 
support for schooling (or lack thereof) by comparing the fruits of their contribu-
tion to financing schools relative to those of other constituencies. This is reported in 
Sect. 6.
4  Our data
We make use of the rich detail of schooling information in the Habsburg school 
census of 1865 and combine it with data on local economic development, such as 
employment structure, local railroad access and use of steam power to investigate 
5 Note that, in line with an earlier footnote, the Tyrolean teachers in most schools were only paid for half 
a year of teaching.
6 Kneidl (1898) cites several examples of a Fassa, an annual itemized account of school-related 
expenses, compiled by each teacher for his school. They show that, by and large, the only expense item 
that was not directly tied to teacher remuneration was classroom firewood.
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this question. The school census listed every single school (almost 11.000 of them) 
and provided information on the number of grades, classrooms, teachers, school-
age children and enrolled pupils. We aggregated the data from individual schools 
into 688 civil subdistricts, used as basic units of reporting in the 1869 population 
census. The descriptive statistics for relevant variables are reported in Table 3.7 As 
is clear from the average population numbers, the typical rural district was fairly 
small—some 17–18.000 inhabitants—which reassures us that, in spite of aggregat-
ing the school data onto the district level, the dataset will preserve most of the rel-
evant cross-sectional variation.
In order to more accurately capture how much teaching actually took place, we 
convert the plain totals of available teaching staff into full-time equivalents by weigh-
ing half-day teachers and half-year teachers at 0.5, since many schools responded to 
overcrowding (i.e., more than 100 pupils per teacher) by splitting their pupils into 
morning and afternoon groups and teaching each for only half a day. The variable 
thus created, Ti, is our measure of the of actual teacher supply in each district. Still, 
ideally, the law envisioned a full-day, year-round instruction for all school-age chil-
dren. This regulation together with the law’s demand that a teacher be hired for every 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics
Based on 688 observations. Unit of observation is the civil subdistrict (Gerichtsbezirk). “Full-time equiv-
alent teachers per 1000 inhabitants” pro-rates half-day and half-year teachers by weighting them at 0.5 
relative to a full-time whole-year teacher. Half-day-half-year teachers are weighted at 0.25. Full-time 
teacher requirement measures how many teachers were supposed to be teaching in a district, according 
to the law, given the reported number of school-age children. The sample includes 69 districts with tradi-
tional urban centers; the remaining 619 are rural
Variable Overall District means
Mean Std. Dev. Urban Rural t test
Full-time equivalent teachers per 1000 inhabit-
ants (Ti)
1.205 0.474 1.327 1.191 − 2.259
Full-time teacher requirement (per 1000 inhabit-
ants) (FTRi)
1.543 0.350 1.347 1.565 4.978
Literacy content index of local labor market (LCi) 0.198 0.069 0.281 0.189 − 11.577
Third-grade exposure (GRi) 0.283 0.221 0.528 0.256 − 10.477
Steam engines per 1000 inhabitants (1863) 0.148 0.306 0.278 0.134 − 3.738
1(Railroad access as of 1865) 0.292 0.455 0.507 0.268 − 4.189
Proportion non-Catholic (NCi) 0.027 0.067 0.069 0.022 − 5.602
1(German majority district) 0.551 0.498 0.522 0.554 0.512
1(Traditional urban center) 0.100 0.301 1 0
Average population in 1869 20,098.4 25,426.4 42,328.5 17,620.4
7 Not all provinces reported a full slate of variables. Galicia, Bukowina and Dalmatia omitted informa-
tion on grades and classrooms and—more importantly—reported the data aggregated to school districts, 
which did not correspond very well to the civil districts. For that reason, we had to omit those provinces 
from our analysis. We also have no data on Hungary.
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100 pupils allows us calculate the full-time teacher requirement, denoted FTRi, for 
each district.8 In other words, we know for each district not only how many (full-
time equivalent) teachers were actually hired but also how many should have been 
hired in accordance with the law. The regulation was, of course, exogenous to each 
district’s hiring decisions and so analyzing how the actual teacher supply depended 
on the teacher requirement can tell us something about the strength of enforcement 
of the regulation. The third-grade exposure, GRi, is the proportion of all school-age 
children in a district attending a school that had three or more grades.9 In line with 
our exposition in Sect. 3, we use this variable as a proxy for the extent to which local 
children were exposed to the instruction in Realia and not just the religious content 
and basic letters taught in the first two grades. We also use the information on the 
mother tongue of pupils to determine which districts were majority German.
We merged this school dataset with information on industrial and technologi-
cal development in these districts. Specifically, we use the 1863 empire-wide survey 
of the use of the steam engine, which we use to calculate our measure of the spread 
of this technology (steam engines per 1000 inhabitants in each district), and annual 
data on access to a railroad (K.k. Statistische Zentral-Commission 1864). The latter 
is a dummy variable, taking on 1 if a district was accessible by railroad by 1865, 0 
otherwise. They are obviously mere proxies for the level of technological sophisti-
cation and the extent of industrialization but they represent some of the most visible 
and widespread industrial technologies, which could reasonably be expected to call 
forth a demand for basic literacy and numeracy. At the same time, steam power was 
a general purpose technology, which could be employed in a wide variety of indus-
tries (even agriculture), which makes it a much better proxy for modern technology, 
broadly speaking, than other industrial technologies which were more sector-specific 
and would therefore correlate with the degree of this or that district’s specialization in 
a particular sector rather than with the general level of technological development. The 
relationship between steam technology and human capital has been similarly exploited 
in the case of France and Great Britain (Lacroix 2018; Diebolt et al. 2017; de Pleijt 
et al. 2018; Franck and Galor 2017). Similar argument can be made for the railroad.
We supplement these technological measures with an index of the literacy con-
tent of the local labor market, LCi. The variable is a combination of two pieces 
of information. The first piece is the local structure of employment, split into 50 
occupations (see Table 10 in the “Appendix” for detail). We draw on the data pub-
lished in the 1869 Cisleithanian census (K.K. Statistische Zentral-Commission 
1871). The second piece of information comes from Mitch (1992: 213–214). It is 
8 The full-time teacher requirement does not just take a district’s total number of school-age children 
and divide it by 100. Given that we have data on every school individually, we can pay attention to the 
dispersion of population across the countryside. For example, two village schools of 49 school-age chil-
dren each will require two full-time teachers. A simple division of an aggregate number by 100 would 
underestimate the requirement in sparsely populated areas and therefore make them look better supplied 
than they actually were.
9 Most such schools were full-day all-year schools but where this was not the case, the pupil numbers 
were prorated. Districts with no third-grade schools at all introduce certain right-censoring into the vari-
able but since they account for only 12% of the sample, that is unlikely to affect the results significantly.
 T. Cvrcek, M. Zajicek 
1 3
a classification of occupations by use of literacy for mid-nineteenth-century Eng-
land.10 We make the assumption that the classification is applicable to the Habsburg 
Empire without major changes, especially since most of the assignments are prob-
ably quite uncontroversial. One potentially significant deviation from Mitch (1992) 
consists in reassigning farmers from the likely category to the ambiguous category, 
given that Austrian farming was not as advanced and sophisticated as the British 
one, and we discuss the impact of this adjustment in the next section.11 The result is 
an index between 0 and 1, where 1 would mean that all jobs in the district required 
literacy, 0 that none did.
At first sight, it may seem counterintuitive to measure the sophistication of the 
local labor market in terms of literacy, given the extensive literature indicating that 
the proportion of literates among adults stagnated and that basic literacy was not 
particularly in demand during early industrialization, yielding a negligible return 
(Mitch 1999; Clark 2007: 175–181). These claims are true for literacy per se. Yet, 
for most of those skills that did bear a return on the labor market, such as read-
ing blueprints, literacy was a stepping-stone from which one progressed further. In 
this context, Franck and Galor (2017) argue that technological development led to 
human capital formation including literacy gains. In places with many workers from 
the “upper tail of the skill distribution,” as described by Mokyr (2005), one would 
obviously find not only higher concentration of practical skills but also higher rates 
of literacy which those skills presupposed. Our measure, moreover, is not based on 
reported literacy among the population but approaches the issue from the side of the 
jobs observed in the various local labor markets.
Table  3 illustrates, among other things, the divide between town and coun-
try in matters of schooling by way of a t test. The evidence is consistent with the 
urban–rural divide apparent in the regulation, as documented in the previous section. 
The dispersed nature of rural population implied that more teachers were required to 
staff rural schools. In contrast, urban schools were better able to meet the regulatory 
requirements. The urban schools were also more sophisticated, as they were more 
likely to offer a broader curriculum. All these observations of schooling correlate 
well with the data on the technological and human capital sophistication of the labor 
10 Mitch (1992) splits occupations into four groups: those where literacy is indispensable, those where 
literacy is useful, those where need for literacy is ambiguous and those that did not make use of literacy. 
The occupations in those four groups are weighted at 1, 0.7, 0.3 and 0.
11 Our motivation for this reassignment of farmers (that is, farm owners and tenants) is that for sev-
eral areas we can ascertain that large proportions of them were in fact illiterate. Consider, for example, 
that according to the 1869 census, farmers amounted to about 40% of adult male population in Galicia. 
Further, those who unambiguously required literacy for their jobs (priests, lawyers, teachers, civil serv-
ants, etc.) were another 10%. But according to the 1890 census, the first one to cite data on literacy by 
age and gender for each province, the percentage of Galician men born before 1850 (and therefore adult 
by 1869), who were literate, reached 18.5% (although with education creep and lower life expectancy 
among illiterates, this number likely overestimates the proportion literate, as it would have been in 1869). 
Noting that 10% of these 18.5% must be those with literacy-requiring jobs, that leaves 8.5% literate men, 
spread across all other occupations. Even if all these were farmers (which they were not), it would still 
leave, at a minimum, almost four fifth of farmers, who must have been farming while illiterate. Similar 
calculation yields about the same fraction of illiterate farmers for Bukowina and Dalmatia. In Istria and 
Carniola, at least a half of all farmers were illiterate by the same argument.
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market: Urban districts were more likely to be connected to the railroad, had more 
steam engines per capita and reported a higher literacy content index. They also had 
a slightly higher percentage of non-Catholics.12 Our ambition in the next section 
is to account for this cross-sectional variation, as much as possible, in terms of the 
interaction between the labor market and the school provision.
5  The spread of schooling: interaction between labor market 
and education
Identifying the interaction between schooling, human capital accumulation and 
the economy is well known to be fraught with considerable complications. While 
the older, Mincerian approach linked productivity and earnings (on the microeco-
nomic level) and economic growth (on the macroeconomic level) to educational 
attainment (measured by years of schooling), recent literature stresses the impor-
tance of the quality and effectiveness of schooling (Glewwe et  al. 2011; Pritchett 
2013). Hanushek (2013: 206), in fact, shows that in regressions explaining economic 
growth, schooling attainment becomes insignificant once cognitive skill measures 
(such as PISA test scores in math and science) are included, highlighting the fact 
that the former actually mismeasures human capital. In addition, the estimation of 
these relationships is complicated by obvious endogeneity between education pro-
vision and economic outcomes (Bils and Klenow 2000). Hanushek and Woess-
mann (2012) investigate the concurrent issues of endogeneity and mismeasurement 
through a wide range of econometric approaches (such as IV and difference-in-dif-
ference) and types of data (cross-country vs individual-level labor market outcomes) 
and show that the strong impact of cognitive skill and weak impact of attained years 
of schooling remains robust across numerous specifications.
Our approach to analyzing the interaction between schooling and economy in 
nineteenth-century Austria needs to be informed by these recent developments in 
the field, even though nineteenth-century sources cannot obviously compete with 
the level of detail and wealth of statistical information on education available today. 
Thus, while we do not have data on the cognitive skills in math and science for 
nineteenth-century pupils in the form of standardized international tests, or even the 
attained years of schooling, we fall back on our close reading of the Austrian regu-
lation of school curriculum to capture the distinction highlighted by Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2012): Functional literacy and numeracy applied to practical knowl-
edge—the cognitive skills that enhance productivity and lead to growth—were 
consistently taught only from the third grade onward. In this way, exposure to the 
third-grade curriculum is the best available proxy for the acquisition of marketable 
cognitive skills. In contrast, pupils in two-grade schools mostly just attended 6 years 
of religious indoctrination.
We address the endogeneity issue by modeling district-level schooling provision 
and its interaction with the labor market in a simultaneous equations framework. 
12 Data on religious composition come also from the 1869 population census.
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The level of skill and sophistication of the local labor market will presumably be 
affected by the quality and quantity of local schooling. At the same time, the extent 
of schooling is a function of the derived demand for education that is informed by 
the returns to human capital on the local labor market. In contrast to parts of the 
literature on education and development, which is not primarily concerned with the 
impact of economy on schooling provision, for us this feedback loop is an important 
part of our argument: We hypothesize that the pace and the dedication with which 
primary schooling spreads positively correlates with the schools’ effectiveness in 
imparting practical knowledge to pupils. When such effectiveness is low, the sup-
port for schooling among the masses will also be low. Pritchett (2013) cites exam-
ples from contemporary developing countries where such dynamic can be observed 
today.
A simultaneous equations framework allows us to model both of these links 
explicitly, using a set of three equations. One of them captures the impact of the 
quality and quantity of schooling on the labor market. The other two equations 
model the impact of the labor market on the two aspects of schooling. Quantity 
of schooling is measured by the number of full-time equivalent teachers per 1000 
inhabitants (Ti).13 Our measure of curriculum quality is the third-grade exposure 
(GRi). Literacy content index (LCi) is our labor market measure.
The system of simultaneous equations is specified as follows:
In Eq.  (1a), the quantity of teachers, Ti, depends on the literacy content index, 
LCi, and on the full-time teacher requirement, FTRi. This specification allows for two 
competing hypotheses, reflecting the contrast between the elites’ push from above by 
way of appropriate legislation and the growth from below motivated by local eco-
nomic conditions. Under the hypothesis that literacy-intensive labor markets gener-
ated strong derived demand for schooling, we should see Ti respond to LCi and the 
coefficient β1 will be large and significant. On the other hand, if Ti was rather driven 
by the force of regulation, where teachers were appointed by administrative fiat and 
not in response to market-driven demand, then Ti will respond to FTRi which cap-
tures the number of teachers desired by the policy-making elites, as implied by the 
law. In such case, δ1 will be significant and presumably fall somewhere between 0 
and 1, with δ1 = 1 corresponding to perfect enforcement. Indicator variables  1i(G) for 
a German majority district and  1i(U) for a district, containing one or more traditional 
(1a)Ti = 훼1 + 훽1LCi + 훿1FTRi + 휃11i(G) + 휇11i(U) + 휀i1
(1b)GRi = 훼2 + 훽2LCi + 훿2NCi + 휃21i(G) + 휇21i(U) + 휀i2
(1c)LCi = 훼3 + Yi휸ퟑ + 훿3GRi + 휁3Ti + 휇31i(U) + 휀i3
13 We could also include classrooms per 1000 inhabitants among the endogenous variables in this sys-
tem of equations, but classrooms and teaching staff are correlated at ρ = 0.98.
1 3
The rise of public schooling in nineteenth-century Imperial…
urban center,14 are added as controls reflecting the law’s stress on socializing pupils 
into German culture15 and its implicit distinction between rural and town schools.
In Eq.  (1b), our quality measure, GRi, depends again on LCi. We expect β2 to 
be positive and significant, given our earlier argument that marketable human cap-
ital was mostly acquired from the third grade onward. We also include, NCi, the 
proportion of non-Catholics (i.e., Protestants and Jews) in district population, as an 
exogenous explanatory variable, given the historical association of Protestantism 
and Judaism with higher demand for literacy (Becker and Woessmann 2009).16 The 
traditional urban dummy and the German dummy capture the effect of the law’s pre-
sumption that urban schools would be more sophisticated than rural schools and that 
Germans probably enjoyed higher returns to functional literacy given the amount of 
useful material published in German relative to other languages of the Empire and 
so would have a higher demand for it, ceteris paribus.
Finally, Eq. (1c) models the link from schooling to labor market. In addition to 
Ti and GRi, the literacy content index, LCi, depends on the urban dummy variable 
and a vector Yi of technological variables, which we take as proxies for the level of 
technological sophistication and economic advance of the local labor market. These 
technological variables are the number of steam engines per 1000 inhabitants and 
a dummy variable for access to railroad by 1865. We motivate their inclusion by 
the observation that technological sophistication of the local economy may affect 
workers’ literacy independently of schooling, such as by way of learning on the job 
through contact with the technologies. If γ3 turn out large and δ3 and ζ3 small, it will 
imply that practical skills were primarily acquired on the labor market and not in 
school.
We sought to anchor the exclusion restrictions that inform our model in the his-
torical context of the issue. Regulation parameters governing the required number of 
full-time teachers in a district, FTRi, had no bearing on the number of grades offered; 
and they would not presumably affect the local labor market literacy content except 
14 Our cutoff for a town is a population of 3000, and we consider a district urban if it has at least 5000 
inhabitants living in such towns. In order to ensure that we capture the traditional market towns, we used 
the earliest town populations that we could find, which date back to 1843 (Tafeln zu Statistik der Oesterre-
ichischen Monarchie 1843). Thus, we are confident that the urban status is exogenous to the schooling sit-
uation in the 1860 s. Other population thresholds for urban status have not affected our estimation results.
15 Even though the schooling promoted socialization into German culture, there are good grounds for 
considering 1i(G) exogenous to schooling. Most of the districts were either overwhelmingly German or 
overwhelmingly non-German—there were only 12 non-German districts where the proportion of Germans 
was above one-third. Thus, it is unlikely that school-induced conversions to Germandom would cause a 
district to flip from non-German to German; and the ethnic boundaries proved to be stable across time.
16 Hanushek and Woessmann (2012: 282) count “varying Catholic church histories”—the complement 
of our variable NCi—among exogenous, plausible instruments in regressions involving schooling (or, 
even more specifically, cognitive skills) and economic development—primarily on account of their long-
term persistence from times before education policies got implemented. Such would be our argument 
also: Austria was obviously a predominantly Catholic country, a consequence of the Habsburg-led Coun-
ter-Reformation. The non-Catholic areas that existed in the country were long-standing pockets of secret, 
undercover Protestantism (and Judaism) that survived the Counter-Reformation but in a very constrained 
mode, so that it could not really proselytize and thereby change the long-standing religious composition 
of the country.
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through schooling actually supplied. Hence, FTRi does not enter into Eqs. (1b) and 
(1c). Proportion of non-Catholic, NCi, does not feature as determinants of Ti in Eq 
(1a) because non-Catholics had scant reason to support the expansion of a schooling 
system of Catholic socialization or to sabotage it given that they were exempt from 
the Catholic religious instruction as long as they could substitute their own from 
their congregations’ own resources (Art. 447). Together with the German dummy, 
NCi is also excluded from Eq. (1c) on the assumption that cultural correlates of lit-
eracy (such as, say, Germandom or Judaism) do not affect LCi except through higher 
demand for effective schooling, i.e., through GRi. In a similar vein, while we include 
Yi, our technological variables, as potential determinants of LCi in Eq. (1c), they do 
not enter into Eqs. (1a) and (1b) because the derived demand for schooling presum-
ably comes from LCi, that is, the more or less literate workers (who may or may not 
be affected by the technologies they come into contact with) rather than the technol-
ogies directly. We also ran Hausman specification tests regarding the potential endo-
geneity of steam engines and of railroad access but neither of these revealed system-
atic coefficient differences from our preferred specification (HSE = 3.06, HRR = 0.57 
where 휒2
0.95
 (258) = 296.5). This reassures us that it yields consistent estimates. With 
three endogenous variables and five excluded exogenous shifters, our specification 
satisfies the order condition. It is easy to verify that the rank condition is also satis-
fied. All these diverse variables are not strictly contemporaneous (with steam engine 
data from 1863, schooling data from 1865 and employment data from 1869). But if 
we can assume that technology, school provision and employment are at least some-
what persistent across time, we can consider them close to contemporaneous. There-
fore, we view the identification as coming entirely from cross-sectional variation.
While our dataset is quite detailed geographically, with 688 separate civil subdis-
tricts as units of observation, the inevitable trade-off is that it is also relatively sparse 
in terms of the number and range of variables that are available at local level. For 
example, a preferred measure of human capital return or of skill premium would be 
the ratio of skilled and unskilled wage. Such statistic may be available on the level 
of the province but not for each district. Consequently, we need to rely on close 
proxies, such as the literacy content index, LCi. In addition, the lack of a greater 
number of potentially useful variables makes the model perhaps too “bare-bones” 
and therefore at risk of bias due to omitted variables. We counter this risk through 
local fixed effects. On the most aggregate level, our dataset contains school districts 
across eleven provinces, so our base specification includes ten province-level fixed 
effects. For a finer account of local variation, we rely on lower-level units: In the 
administrative system of Imperial Austria, groups of two to five civil subdistricts 
(our unit of observations) combined to form political districts which formed the low-
est level of political administration. There were 258 of them. We therefore include 
in the model 257 political district fixed effects, which capture the impact of district-
specific idiosyncratic factors and thus somewhat mitigate potential selection prob-
lems driven by unobservables. As a result, the identification comes from variation 
within those political districts.
The results are presented in Table  4. Columns (i)–(iii) show the estimates with 
province-level fixed effects, columns (iv)–(vi) estimates with district-level fixed 
effects. The coefficients in these two specifications are structurally quite similar, so 
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our discussion focuses on the results based on the finer geographic controls, in col-
umns (iv)–(iv). Coefficients in Eq. (1a) show that the diffusion and extent of elemen-
tary schooling was driven primarily by the enforcement of the regulations rather than 
derived demand for marketable human capital. The coefficient on LCi is not only of 
the “wrong” sign and statistically insignificant, it is also tiny: Combined with s.e. 
(LCi) = 0.069, the local labor market literacy content would not make an appreciable 
impact on district teaching staff, even if the coefficient were ten times as large. On 
the other hand, with δ1 = 0.451 the impact of FTRi was sizeable. For every full-time 
teacher required by the law, a district hired on average 0.451 teachers, or not quite 
one half-day teacher. This coefficient is statistically different not only from 0 but 
also from 1: The regulation was far from being translated into reality at one-to-one. 
A negligible β1 and positive δ1 together imply that the policy-making elites forced, 
through regulation, more schooling on the people than the people thought worth it.
In Eq. (1b), however, the link between schooling and local labor market is strong. 
Exposure to third- and higher-grade curriculum (GRi) strongly responded to LCi, so 
that increasing the explanatory variable by one standard deviation (0.069) was associ-
ated with extra 38% school-age children attending a three-grade school, which is almost 
twice the size of s.d.(GRi) = 0.22. So, when literacy played a significant role in the 
local labor market, it also generated strong demand for third-grade curriculum (while 
it played little to no role in determining where a school would be established as per 
Eq. 1a). This stark contrast between insignificant β1 and large β2 is consistent with our 
reading of the law that practical, marketable skills were only taught from third grade on, 
while the lower two grades generated little in return-bearing human capital in pupils.
Finally, in Eq. (1c) we observe the impact that schooling had on the labor market. 
Starting from the least impactful variables, the technological variables do not record 
any sizeable effect, which suggests that the useful human capital was not acquired 
when workers encountered new technologies on the job. Clearly, what mattered were 
the schools—but not whether a district had enough schools and teachers but rather 
what kind of schools it had. The impact of Ti is quite small (ζ3 × s.d.(Ti) = 0.012 × 0.
474 = 0.006) while that of third-grade exposure is appreciable (δ3 × s.d.(GRi) = 0.19
1 × 0.221 = 0.042). An increase in literacy content index by 0.042, given the way we 
have constructed it, is equivalent to about 6% local workers progressing from occu-
pations where the use of literacy was ambiguous to jobs where it was indispensable. 
Note that this negligible impact of rudimentary schooling, represented by Ti, once 
exposure to the more advanced third-grade curriculum, GRi, is introduced, mirrors 
the results reported, for example, in Hanushek (2013): It is not schooling per se that 
enhances productivity and growth, it is schooling that imparts something practical 
and functional that generates a positive return.
In Table 5, the specification and data are the same as in Table 4, except for a differ-
ent classification of farming with respect to the use of literacy, as the table titles indi-
cate. As we mentioned at the end of Sect. 4, our assignment of farming to the “ambig-
uous” category deviates from Mitch’s (1992) classification. Table  5 shows how 
sensitive our results are to this change. Columns (i)–(iii) in both tables do not exhibit 
much difference, whether in terms of size of coefficients or significance. The excep-
tion is the coefficient on third-grade exposure in Eq. (1c), which becomes smaller and 
insignificant. In columns (iv)–(vi), the change does not affect the results in Eq. (1a) 
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and in the other two equations the coefficients have the same signs and order of mag-
nitude but their values go down and lose significance also. The reason is that reclas-
sifying farming as likely a literate job increases the measured sophistication of the 
labor markets in rural districts and makes the difference between country and city on 
this score appear smaller.17 Consequently, a larger part of the urban–rural difference 
that in Table 4 is captured by the educational variables is in Table 5 accounted for by 
the urban dummy, especially in Eq. (1b). The contrast between the two tables shows 
that, once the 257 district-level fixed effects are included, the estimation is somewhat 
sensitive to measurement of literacy content but, for reasons that we have given at 
the end of Sect. 4, we consider coding literacy in farming as ambiguous a more accu-
rate reflection of the historical reality of Austria of 1860s and for that reason see the 
results in columns (iv)–(vi) of Table 4 as the better estimate.
Considering these results, how conducive to economic development was the Aus-
trian schooling system as a whole then? The third-grade curriculum clearly could 
make a difference to the level of sophistication on the local labor market. But as of 
1865, two-thirds of all pupils (three quarters in the countryside) attended only two-
grade schools. This severely limited the contribution that Austrian primary schools 
could make. Moreover, the coefficients from columns (v) and (vi) in Table 4 sug-
gest a potential divergence between high-skill and low-skill districts, ending with an 
under-education trap for the latter. High-literacy labor markets encouraged expan-
sion of the curriculum beyond the second grade, which further enhanced the sophis-
tication of the local labor force. A virtuous cycle of sorts could develop. On the 
other hand, districts with low GRi and LCi would tend to stay low. (Note that other 
variables in these equations do not offer much opportunity to exogenously push a 
low-skill district onto a path of human capital development.) Such interpretation is 
consistent with some anecdotal historical evidence: Frank (1898a: 17) relates the 
widespread introduction of third-grade curriculum in many towns during the boom 
of the 1850s, while the countryside remained very lukewarm about any such exten-
sion (Cvrcek and Zajicek 2018). One might therefore somewhat cynically conclude 
that the elites’ original plan succeeded: The schooling system kept the peasants pli-
ant while conceding to the towns the necessary means for at least some accumula-
tion of useful human capital.
6  Interaction of school provision and local politics
For one of the provinces, Lower Austria, we are able to look at school decisions at 
an even finer detail, by considering determinants of the changing supply of teach-
ers and classrooms in individual schools. This will allow us to look at where the 
financial support for schools came from. We matched the 1865 school census with 
a teacher directory published in 1852 (containing information as of Autumn 1851), 
17 It also produces certain unusual outcomes: For example, it makes the Istrian district of Castelnuovo, 
where over 90% of the workforce was still in agriculture in 1869, a more sophisticated labor market than 
the industrialized and urbanized districts of North Bohemia, with two-thirds in industrial employment.
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which includes information not only about each individual teacher in the province 
but also data about the schools where they served (Kaiser 1852). As a result, we 
know, for each school, how many classrooms, teachers and pupils it had in both 
years and, most importantly, from the 1852 source we know the school patron.
There were 1143 schools in Lower Austria in 1865. Of those, we do not use the 91 
Viennese schools, which were all run by the city council and obviously unrepresenta-
tive of the usual country school. Another 29 schools were excluded because they were 
new in 1865 and less than 14 years in operation, lacking the 1851 data. Of the remain-
ing 1023 schools, we successfully matched 1013 across the two periods.18 There were 
a few cases where the school record was incomplete but even excluding those, we 
have, outside Vienna, a near-complete universe of all Lower-Austrian schools.
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for this one-province dataset. Most of the 
schools were small, with one classroom and one teacher, although a non-negligible 
portion also had a teaching assistant. The ratio of 1865 enrollment to 1851 enroll-
ment, with a mean of 0.996, shows that overall the pupil population was fairly sta-
ble. “Change in steam power” is our measure of technological change on the local 
18 In addition, there were also 22 schools extant in 1852 but defunct by 1865 for which we do not have 
the 1865 data.
Table 6  Means and standard deviations for schools in Lower Austria
1851 1865 H0: X1865 = X1851
Classrooms per school 1.299 1.402 t = 6.72[0.761] [0.837] p-value = 0.000
Teachers per school 1.552 1.577 t = 1.121[1.027] [1.039] p-value = 0.263
Pupils per school 135.65 131.93 t = -3.02[99.14] [97.87] p-value = 0.003
Pupils per classroom 105.87 94.88 t = -8.59[51.73] [41.25] p-value = 0.000
Pupils per teacher 90.49 85.89 t = -3.83[41.21] [36.87] p-value = 0.000
1(classroom expansion) 0.112[0.315]
1(new teacher hired) 0.142[0.349]
Growth in pupils (ratio of 1865
pupils to 1851 pupils)
0.996
[0.281]
Change in steam power in HP 




Number of observations (schools) 1013
Number of school/church districts 45
Number of civil districts 70
By “urban location” we mean schools in towns with more than 2000 inhabitants as of the 1857 popula-
tion census. “Change in steam power” is the change, between 1851 and 1865, in the total horse power 
embedded in steam engines employed in each school’s village
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level (K.k. Statistische Zentral-Commission 1852, 1864).19 No other economic sta-
tistics were consistently available at the level of individual villages, except for the 
location and size of steam engines for 1852 and 1863. We take the difference in total 
locally employed horsepower embedded in local steam engines as a proxy for the 
pace of technological change and therefore changing technological sophistication. 
The indicator variable for urban location takes on 1 for all schools located in locali-
ties that, as of the 1857 census, had at least 2000 inhabitants.
The t-tests in Table 6 show a systematic difference in most of the school char-
acteristics across the 14 years but practically, the changes were mostly quite small. 
Values for pupils per teacher and pupils per classroom indicate that Lower Austria 
made some progress toward greater compliance with official regulation but it was 
modest progress. Table  7, in fact, provides a more detailed picture on this score 
while also splitting the schools by type of school patron. Looking only at classrooms 
and teachers per 1000 pupils alone, one could have concluded that Lower Austria 
by and large was on the right side of the law. But when we use data for individual 
schools to calculate the proportions of compliant schools, the picture is far grim-
mer, especially in terms of classrooms. The last two columns show the proportion 
of schools that hit the government target of fewer than 100 pupils per classroom 
and per teacher and enjoying full-day education for the whole year: In this one of 
the most advanced provinces with a near-complete network of primary schools, only 
about one-fifth (in 1851) and one quarter (in 1865) of schools fully cleared the regu-
lation bar. The table yields only ambiguous evidence on which type of patron was 
most supportive to schooling provision: Municipal patronage correlated with high 
availability of classrooms and staff but the instruction was apparently not sustained 
for a full day, all year long (perhaps the classrooms were too small?). Feudal lords, 
on the other hand, supported schools with lower levels of provisions but they over-
saw some of the fastest improvements in compliance over the fourteen-year period.
The detailed information on school patronage is relevant to the debate on the role of 
entrenched landed interest in provision of schooling. In cases of countries with non-dem-
ocratic politics, where election participation and results do not exist, the frequently pos-
ited statistical relationship between land access inequality and school provision usually 
leaves the actual political process around school financing unspecified—a black box hid-
ing the implicit assumption that where there was a political will (to obstruct), the landed 
interests could find the way. With our information on school patrons and the law’s spe-
cific stipulations about how schools should be financed, we can get a much better, closer 
look at who negotiated with whom and which financing items were at stake.
As mentioned above, school patrons—usually the local landowners—were sad-
dled with paying for maintenance and contributing to physical expansion of schools. 
After 1848, the last remnants of feudal administration were abolished and just as 
peasants were now freed from forced labor, the aristocrats, too, expected to be freed 
from the burdens of feudal public administration. This indeed came to pass in many 
respects but in case of school patronage, the legislative adjustment was piecemeal. 
19 Note that we excluded steam engines as a determinant of schooling supply in Sect. 4 on the grounds 
that its effect operates through its impact on local human capital. But since we cannot calculate the lit-
eracy content index for individual Lower-Austrian villages (lacking sufficiently detailed data), we include 
a steam power among explanatory variables here.
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Specifically, in 1849, the ministry of education declared that patrons were still 
expected and obliged to pay for maintenance but that the cost of school expansion 
was subject to voluntary mutual understanding with other school-financing parties 
(primarily the municipalities which now inherited many of the public duties previ-
ously performed by aristocratic landlords); should such understanding fail to materi-
alize, all large-scale works were to be currently suspended (Helfert 1860, 140). This 
was a temporary fix, and the declaration promised a new, thorough legislative treat-
ment of school financing in short order. But no such new legislation was passed until 
the liberal reforms of 1869, with the exception of outright abolition of the school 
patronage—in Lower Austria in April 1864. This “temporary” institutional frame-
work of the years 1849–1864 gives us an opportunity to look more closely at which 
social groups and political constituencies were the likely supporters or obstructors 
of schools. We use our Lower-Austrian data on classrooms and teachers in the years 
1851 and 1865 to see how likely an extra classroom was built and an extra teacher 
hired, conditional on the number of pupils and type of school patron, who differed 
from each other in their preferences. For classroom expansion, our specification is:
where 1(exp) is an indicator of classroom expansion, taking on 1 if a new classroom were 
built between 1851 and 1865, 1(Patroni) are indicator variables for four different types of 
patrons (leaving the fifth, central government, as the omitted category), 1(urban) is an 
urban dummy, 1(non-compliant) is an indicator of non-compliance with regulation in 
1851, taking on 1 when the number of pupils per classroom in 1851 was above 100, and 
0 otherwise, ppc51 is the actual number of pupils per classroom in 1851, growth is the 
ratio of pupils in 1865 to pupils in 1851, and ΔHP is the change in local steam engine 
horsepower between 1851 and 1863. We estimate analogous model for staff expansion 
where ppc51 is replaced with ppt51, or pupils per teacher in 1851, and non-compliance 
is defined with respect to the teacher regulation but all other variables are the same.
We can formulate alternative hypotheses about the patrons’ behavior, depending on 
the underlying theory. If the “obstructionist elites vs popular demand” explanation is 
correct, we expect the schools of central government patronage to expand only when 
they are overcrowded (by regulation standards) but not otherwise, the schools of feu-
dal patronage to expand rarely (even when overcrowded) due to elite resistance and 
the schools of local municipal patronage to expand often (possibly even when NOT 
overcrowded) but certainly not less than schools of other patronage. Why? The central 
authorities presumably expressed their preferences in their school regulations and so in 
the 32.8% of schools where central government was the school patron, they would be 
guided primarily by the parameters laid down there. The landed interests—the former 
feudal lords, still stuck with the residual patronage obligations—now had a stronger 











+ 훽51(urban) + 훽61(noncompliant) + 훽71(urban)
× 1(noncompliant) + 훽8ppc51 + 훽9growth + 훽10ΔHP
)
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20 The preferences of religious orders are not clear a priori but they were a large, clearly defined group 
so we use them as an additional, separate control.
fixed costs of construction was voluntary, while their continuing obligation to pay for 
maintenance of all school premises (even if school expansion were built on someone 
else’s dime) gave them an incentive to veto the expansion. When the municipalities 
acted as school patrons, they had to pay for new construction out of their own pocket 
(while also financing teacher salaries), but since this confluence of salary, maintenance 
and all other obligations under one roof made them the sole stakeholders, they were 
also able to avoid potentially difficult negotiations with other parties. If landed oppo-
sition to broad taxation for school purposes was the main constraint, then municipal 
patronage, unhindered by this opposition, should have had more success in raising 
resources for the expansion. In fact, if there were a truly strong popular demand for 
schooling, municipal patronage could be expected to expand schools faster not only 
relative to feudal patronage but even compared to government patronage where expan-
sion presumably stopped once regulations were satisfied.20
An alternative hypothesis would be that the opposition to schools did not come 
from the landed elites but from other strata, such as the general population. We saw 
in Sect.  5 that economic impact of schooling was likely weak, and in Sect.  3 that 
the conservative ideological motivation behind the curriculum was strong, so there 
are grounds for expecting the conservative elements (such as the landed elites and a 
monarchical government) to have some stake in such schooling system. If that were the 
case, i.e., if feudal lords and central government made a financial difference in support 
of it, we would expect the municipally financed schools to be the least likely to expand 
because they had to carry the cost of expansion themselves whereas other communities 
had outside contribution from their patron. This hypothesis turns, to some extent, on 
the content, i.e., practical economic usefulness of the education, which was fully under 
the control of the central government. The only variation in content that the regulation 
allowed was in the number of grades taught: Country schools were mostly expected 
to teach only two grades, while urban schools could add a third and sometimes even 
a fourth grade. Both past (Frank 1898b: 62) and modern analysts (Engelbrecht 1986: 
230) agree that towns seized on this option, thereby opening a gap between urban and 
rural schools. Since we only have grades data for 1865, we cannot model expansion of 
content across time but we can proxy for the difference by separating rural and urban 
communities using the dummy variable 1(urban). In 1865, some 75 schools out of 
1013 were urban schools by our definition of a town and they offered 3.01 grades on 
average, whereas the remaining 938 country schools taught an average of 2.26 grades 
(t = 12.6, p value = 0.00). The skills taught in higher grades, potentially useful in crafts 
or entry-level clerk jobs, could, we assume, incentivize towns and cities to invest more 
in their schools relative to their rural counterparts.
Table 8 reports the coefficients and the marginal effects from the probit estima-
tion for classroom expansion. For comparison, we also include results from a linear 
probability model (LPM), estimated by way of a simple OLS: It is straightforward to 
see that the two models yield structurally similar results. Our main model is reported 
in column (iii), while column (i) shows the same specification without the fixed 
effects for civil and church (or school) districts. Note from the difference in number 
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Fig. 1  Imputed probability of classroom expansion by type of school patron
of observations in the two models that the district dummies perfectly predicted fail-
ure (to expand) for 262 schools, or about a quarter. As a result, in the estimation 
sample of 721 schools, some 15.5% actually built new classrooms, as opposed to 
11.2% in the overall sample. Most of the effects have signs and sizes that are intui-
tive and realistic. For example, the marginal effect on pupils per classroom implies 
that for every 5 pupils, the probability of building a new classroom increased by 
1%. Similarly, a 10% increase in pupil population between 1851 and 1865 increased 
that probability by about 2.74%. The change in steam power had a weak impact: 
An increase by one standard deviation (15.3HP) would raise the probability by 
0.9%. But the institutional variables are the most interesting. The coefficients and 
marginal effects on patron types indicate that having the central government for a 
patron (the omitted category) was most conducive for a classroom expansion: All 
patron dummy variables have a negative impact—not a large one but not a negligi-
ble one either. For example, a school of municipal patronage was 6.5% less likely to 
build a new classroom than a school of central government patronage. In a sample, 
where 15.5% of all schools built a new classroom over the period, that is a notice-
able difference. Importantly, the feudal patronage had the smallest negative impact. 
There also appears a big difference between urban and rural schools but it is particu-
larly strong when a school was in violation of the classroom regulation: An urban 
school that was non-compliant in 1851 was on average 22.5% more likely to build 
an extra classroom by 1865 compared to its non-compliant rural counterpart. The 
enforcement was clearly weaker in the countryside, with the mean marginal impact 
of non-compliance equal to 0.019, compared to 0.157 for urban schools. These 
results are more clearly visible in Fig.  1, which contains the imputed probability 
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of classroom expansion for schools in various institutional settings and which high-
lights the impact of regulation enforcement in towns and cities: The marginal impact 
of the 101st pupil in a classroom reached 43.1% for urban schools under central gov-
ernment patronage and 28.0% for urban schools under municipal patronage. Con-
trast that with the almost toothless enforcement in the countryside (less than a 1% 
increase in probability of expansion at the crossing of the regulation threshold). 
There, the central government’s best chance of increasing the school supply was not 
to send a circular citing its regulation but to send the money in its role of the school 
patron.  
The overall pattern is quite similar in Table 9 and Fig. 2, which report the result 
of a comparable probit model for teaching staff expansion, where the dependent var-
iable is 1 if the number of local teachers increased between 1851 and 1865. As in 
the case of classrooms, the teacher supply, too, responded predictably to the num-
ber of pupils per teacher and their growth; the steam power proved unimportant as 
a determinant and the schools of municipal patronage were the least likely to hire 
more staff relative to schools under other patronage. But with staff, we cannot blame 
patronage directly, for patrons had no responsibility regarding staff outlays. The 
impact was indirect: Patron municipalities, saddled with the financial costs of both 
kinds of expansion, were apparently less likely, other things held equal, to under-
take either. Together, the results in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that the type of school 
patron did matter and that non-municipal patronage, as a source of “outside money,” 
made a tangible financial difference. The central government was the most generous 
school patron, followed by the feudal lords. It is hard to square this evidence with 
the notion that the landed elites were the main obstacle to school expansion. It is 
even harder to interpret it as indicating a grassroots support for expansion of school-
ing along the extensive margin: The schools of municipal patronage, where the local 
population was most completely in control of the local school supply, expanded most 
reluctantly. If the main hindrance to school expansion had been the landed elites’ 
veto (as opposed to scarcity of resources), the schools that were free of it should 
have flourished most. Even in urban areas, where one might expect the dynamism 
of modern economic sectors to generate some popular demand, the estimation offers 
more support for the large role played by the vigorous enforcement of government 
regulation, i.e., prodding from above rather than a push from below.
One final result should not get lost in the school patron analysis. The legally 
stipulated 100-pupil benchmark was far from ideal for effective education, as was 
recognized even by contemporaries. Yet, for both classrooms and staff, expansion 
was highly unlikely across the board once schools got on the right side of the regula-
tion.21 The rarity of expansion in regulation-compliant schools—the fact that even 
21 Rural schools were unlikely to expand even when they were on the wrong side of it, unless the number 
of pupils per classroom rose quite far above 100. They were more likely to teach half-days and only when 
even those arrangements strained the capacity did they opt for expansion.
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the central government, the most avid patron, looked at best to just make good on 
its own regulation (especially in towns) but go no further—suggests that the kind 
of schooling on offer in Austria was not particularly desired or loved by anyone. 
Even in that context of general apathy, however, the landed interests do not deserve 
the bad press they usually get—not in the Austrian case, anyway. In column (v) of 
Tables 8 and 9, we present our estimates of the same models, this time stripped of all 
the regulatory and patron-related variables. The coefficients and marginal effects of 
the remaining variables are structurally similar to columns (i) and (iii) but note that, 
seizing on the large marginal effect of the urban dummy, one could easily reinterpret 
these results as showing that the modernizing, industrializing cities were expanding 
and staffing their schools fast while the countryside, the power base of the landed 
elites, lagged behind. The aristocrats can make for easy scapegoats, and it takes the 
detailed analysis of the local, school-specific information on patrons (together with a 
description of the institutional framework of school financing) to show that the situ-
ation was in fact different. Without such analysis and such information, one could 
easily reach the more prevalent conclusion of “Tory opposition.”
Fig. 2  Imputed probability of staff expansion by type of school patron
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7  Conclusions
The analysis reveals several important features of the Habsburg educational system. 
Firstly, any evidence of a positive effect of this schooling policy on economic devel-
opment we find is limited to instruction in practical subjects from third grade on, 
which was denied to an overwhelming majority of the population. On some level, 
this is not surprising because economic advance was never the main aim of the 
schooling system the Habsburg government was trying to put together. Secondly, 
we find next to no support for the notion that the prospect of economic develop-
ment generated a strong derived demand for the public education the Habsburg rul-
ers were offering—again, with a caveat applying to higher grades. Apparently, the 
Viennese government designed a flawed product, decreed that it be oversupplied and 
burdened local communities with paying for it. We have no estimate of how much 
deadweight loss this policy generated but given that the government imposed more 
schooling than was demanded by the general population, one may expect that there 
must have been some. Thirdly, we also find little evidence to suggest that the landed 
elites were the main political bulwark against the spread of primary schooling, as is 
often argued. After all, the system was designed to yield them a political dividend. 
But it was also granted partially as a concession to changing times. Consequently, 
they were not enthusiastic supporters of it but they carried out their assigned duties 
within the institutional framework and they did it to somewhat greater extent than 
some other types of school patrons.
Overall, this adds up to a different picture to that painted regarding the modern 
rise of public education. While all the elements of the usual story—the industri-
alization, the public provision of schools, the political voice of important pressure 
groups—are present in the Austrian case, they combine in a way very different from 
how, for example, Go and Lindert (2007, 2010) have described the rise of American 
public schooling. In any country, the buildup of a modern education system was an 
extensive and onerous task, involving a complex interaction between the economic 
and political spheres and numerous margins on which decisions had to be taken. 
That is why attention to detail is of some importance. We hope to have provided 
such detailed context.
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Appendix: Measuring literacy content of local labor market
Table 10  Assignment of 
occupations to various literacy 
categories
The assignments are based on Mitch (1992: 213–214). The * denotes 
those occupations which in the original document are further disag-
gregated into various sectors (e.g., 8 separate industrial sectors)
Literacy required (L = 1)
Priests and nuns, public sector clerks, army officers, teachers, 
students, writers, artists, lawyers, doctors, surgeons, midwives, 
pharmacists, sanitation workers, clerks in the private sector*, 
entrepreneurs and business owners*, employees in finance
Literacy likely to be useful (L = 0.7)
Employees in the trading sector, rentiers and renters of real property
Occupations with possible (or ambiguous) use of literacy (L = 0.3)
Farmers, sharecroppers, laborers*, domestic service
Occupations unlikely to use literacy (L = 0)
Agricultural laborers and farm servants, fishermen, industrial labor-
ers*, those without occupation
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Kudler J (1821) Steyermarks Volkszahl in den Jahren 1819 und 1820 nebst vergleichenden Rückblicken 
auf frühere Jahre. Steyermärkische Zeitschrift 1(1821):116–153
Lacroix J (2018) Steam democracy up! Industrialization-led opposition in Napoleonic plebiscites. Eur 
Rev Econ Hist 22(2):135–160
Lindert P (2004) Chapter 5—The rise of mass public schooling before 1914. In: Growing public: social 
spending and economic growth since the eighteenth century. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp 
87–127
Lott JR Jr (1999) Public schooling, indoctrination and totalitarianism. J Polit Econ 107(S6):S127–S157
Mariscal E, Sokoloff K (2000) Schooling, suffrage and the persistence of inequality in the Americas. In: 
Haber S (ed) Political institutions and economic growth in Latin America: essays in policy, history 
and political economy. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, pp 159–218
Maschek L (1880) Zur Geschichte und Praxis der Volkszählung in Dalmatien. Statistische Monatschrift 
5:351–356
Melton JVH (1988) Absolutism and the eighteenth century origins of compulsory schooling in Prussia 
and Austria. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England
Mitch D (1992) The rise of popular literacy in Victorian England: the influence of private choice and 
public policy. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia
Mitch D (1999) The role of education and skill in the British industrial revolution. In: Mokyr J (ed) The 
British Industrial Revolution: an economic perspective, 2nd edn. Westview, Boulder, pp 241–279
Mitch D (2012) Landed society, farm size, and support for public schooling in nineteenth century Eng-
land. Working Paper
Mokyr J (2005) Long term economic growth and the history of technology. In: Philippe A, Durlauf S 
(eds) Handbook of economic growth, vol 1B. Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp 1113–1180
Mokyr J, Voth H-J (2010) Understanding growth in early modern Europe. In: Stephen B, O’Rourke K 
(eds) The Cambridge economic history of Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 
7–42
Musacchio A, Fritscher AM, Viarengo M (2014) Colonial institutions, trade shocks, and the diffusion of 
elementary education in Brazil, 1889–1930. J Econ Hist 74(3):730–766
Nafziger S (2011) Did Ivan’s vote matter? The political economy of local democracy in Tsarist Russia. 
Eur Rev Econ Hist 15(3):393–441
Palma N, Reis J (2018) Can autocracy promote literacy? Evidence from a cultural alignment success 
story. CEPR discussion paper 12811
Prausek V (1868) Die Verbesserung der Volksschule mi besondere Berucksichtigung Oesterreichs. Sall-
mayer & Co., Wien
Pritchett L (2013) The rebirth of education: schooling ain’t learning. Brookings Institution Press, 
Baltimore
Pritchett L, Viarengo M (2015) The state, socialization, and private schooling: when will governments 
support alternative producers? J Dev Stud 51(7):784–807
Ramcharan R (2010) Inequality and redistribution: evidence from U.S. counties and states, 1890–1930. 
Rev Econ Stat 92(4):729–744
Ramirez FO, Boli J (1987) The political construction of mass schooling: European origins and worldwide 
institutionalization. Sociol Educ 60(1):2–17
Sala-i-Martin X (1997) I just ran two million regressions. Am Econ Rev Am Econ Assoc 87(2):178–183
Sokoloff KL, Engerman SL (2000) History lessons: institutions, factor endowments, and paths of devel-
opment in the new world. J Econ Perspect 14(3):217–232
Springer J (1840) Statistik des österreichischen Kaiserstaates. Fr. Beck’s Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 
Vienna
Vollrath D (2013) Inequality and school funding in the rural United States, 1890. Explor Econ Hist 
50:267–284
1 3
The rise of public schooling in nineteenth-century Imperial…
von Liechtenstern JMF (1803) Archiv für Geographie und Statistik ihre Hülfswissenschaften und Litera-
tur, vol 1. Verlag des Kunst- und Industrue-Comtoirs, Vienna
von Liechtenstern JMF (1817) Handbuch der neuesten geographie des Österreichischen Kaiserstaates, 
Vols. 1–3. B. Ph. Bauer, Vienna
Weiss A (1904) Geschichte der Österreichischen Volksschule 1792–1848. Verlagsbuchhandlung Styria, 
Graz
